Implementation of a hybrid scheme for coherent plug-and-play quantum key
  distribution by Grande, Ignacio H. López & Larotonda, Miguel A.
Implementation of a hybrid scheme for coherent plug-and-play quantum key
distribution
Ignacio H. Lo´pez Grande1, 2 and Miguel A. Larotonda1, 2, 3
1DEILAP, CITEDEF-CONICET, J.B. de La Salle 4397, 1603 Villa Martelli, Buenos Aires, Argentina
2Departamento de Fsica, FCEyN, UBA, Ciudad Universitaria, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina
3UNIDEF, CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentin
(Dated: 08 June 2018)
We experimentally demonstrate a hybrid configuration for Quantum Key Distribution, that com-
bines the simplicity of Distributed Phase Reference protocols with the self-referencing features and
polarization insensitivity of the so-called Plug & Play system. Additionally, all the components are
arranged in a server-client scheme to allow for practical key distribution. Blank, coherent pulse pair
trains are generated at the reception end of the link by means of a pulse sequence and an unbalanced
interferometer, and sent to the other end. The emitter writes the qubits by erasing one of the pulses
from the pair as in a Coherent-One Way protocol. Detection, as well as eavesdropping monitoring
is performed at the receiver side, using the same interferometer that was used to generate the initial
phase-referenced pulses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the name of a col-
lection of techniques and protocols that guarantees secure
communication between two parties using the principles
of quantum mechanics. Users at both ends of the QKD
link produce a shared random secret key, which they can
later use to encrypt and decrypt information. The secret
key is to be known only to the two communicating users.
The laws of quantum mechanics give them the ability
to detect the presence of any third party trying to gain
knowledge of the key: anyone trying to eavesdrop on the
key eventually has to measure it, hence disturbing the
system and introducing measurable changes. QKD was
originally introduced in 1984 [1], and since then it evolved
rapidly, particularly in the last two decades. This evolu-
tion led to a fast growth of the field, which is now mature
enough to start to be implemented in demanding real life
environments such as metropolitan fiber networks [2–5]
and ground-to-satellite quantum links [6].
Massive and global implementation of QKD systems
demands fast and simple schemes for secret key distribu-
tion. Efforts and achievements have been concentrated in
improving components [7, 8] and developing better pro-
tocols [9–11] towards fast, reliable and continuous opera-
tion in real world telecommunication networks [4, 12–14].
The present work attempts to introduce an improvement
on a QKD protocol designed to operate on telecom op-
tical fiber, by combining a Plug & Play interferometric
setup that provides self phase referencing and compen-
sation of birefringence [9, 15], and the simplicity and
potential high-speed performance of distributed-phase-
reference protocols such as Differential Phase Shift (DPS)
[10, 16–18] and Coherent One-Way (COW) QKD [11, 19–
21]. Furthermore, the presented setup is arranged in a
client-server QKD scheme, where the complex and sensi-
tive resources such as the light source and the detectors
are situated at the server side. On the other side, the
client setup only comprises an amplitude modulator ar-
ranged in a passive Sagnac loop.
The key is generated according to the COW protocol,
in which a train of pulses share a constant relative phase,
and the bits are encoded in pairs of pulses by varying the
pulse intensity. Shared, stable and self aligning phase
is obtained by means of a pulse pattern carved within
the laser photon’s wave packet and an unbalanced inter-
ferometer that is used both to generate and to monitor
the inter-pulse coherence. This last effect is achieved by
adopting the double pass of the Plug & Play configura-
tion: a train of pulses is produced by Bob and sent to
Alice. She writes the bits and sends the pulse train back
to Bob, who measures on a data line to obtain the key,
and on an interferometric monitoring line to detect an
eventual eavesdropper that alters the visibility of the in-
terferometer by breaking the coherence between pulses
[19, 22].
Alice’s stage is implemented with a Sagnac fiber loop
based on a polarizing beamsplitter that contains an in-
tensity modulator acting on the two polarization states.
The device ensures an optimized efficiency of the modu-
lator, regardless of the state of polarization at the input.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SETUP
The scheme is based on a Plug & Play architecture,
with distributed phase reference (COW) encoding. In
the proposed setup, blank symbols are defined by pairs
of pulses, which must have a fixed phase reference. These
symbols are generated at Bob’s stage using a combi-
nation of a temporal pulse pattern and an unbalanced
Michelson interferometer with Faraday mirrors, and sub-
sequently sent to Alice. In turn, Alice generates the key
by writing the bits on each of the symbols: ‘0s’ and ‘1s’
are encoded by erasing a single pulse from each symbol
(Fig. 1). She also leaves some symbols untouched (decoy
states) to monitor for eavesdropping, before sending the
stream back to Bob: the possible states are therefore the
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FIG. 1: The hybrid scheme for Coherent Plug & Play Quantum
Key Distribution. The server-side is composed by a CW DFB
laser followed by an electro-absorption modulator which generates
800 ps light pulses, a circulator and the FMI which generate in-
tense ”blank pulses” patterns. For the detection the server side
uses the same FMI to measure the coherence of the received se-
quence and a tap to detect the arrival time of the photons, both
with a single SPCM in a multiplexed scheme (not shown). The
client-side consists just in a intensity modulator displayed in a
ring configuration by means of a Polarizing Beam Splitter
early state |e〉, which holds for the key bit value ‘0’, the
late state |`〉 corresponding to the bit ‘1’ of the secret key
and a coherent superposition of this two, the decoy state:
|e〉+eiφ(t)|`〉. The relative phase φ is in principle a slowly
varying function of time associated to the mechanical and
thermal fluctuations of the interferometer.
In the last part of the process, Bob reads the bits at
the main line and measures visibility with his interfer-
ometer to check for coherence between successive optical
pulses at the monitoring line. An alteration on the in-
terferometric visibility is associated with an eavesdrop-
per attack. Most of the critical and resource demanding
tasks are performed at the server side, while the client
side only comprises an intensity modulation operation.
A. Pulse pattern generation and qubit writing
Blank symbols are generated as intense light pulses,
arranged in 435 MHz pulse packets. In this demonstra-
tion, in order to simplify the analysis we use the shortest
possible pulse packet, consisting of four pulses that share
a common phase. First, a sequence of two pulses sepa-
rated by 4.6 ns is tailored from a single wavepacket of
a 1548 nm DFB laser with an electro-absorption modu-
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FIG. 2: Temporal count distribution for different light pulse widths
obtained by controlling the Electro-Absorption Modulator of the
telecom CW laser. The three temporal profiles are generated with
different settings of the EAM driver.
lator (EAM). An ad-hoc built electrical pulse generator
based on fast ECL logical gates and a commercial EAM
driver (Maxim Integrated MAX3941) were used for that
purpose; using this combination we are able to generate
optical pulses as short as 450 ps FWHM at frequencies up
to hundreds of MHz. Figure 2 shows pulses with differ-
ent widths obtained by these means. In order to increase
the signal-to-noise ratio of the pulses, an Intensity Mod-
ulator (IM) generating 35 ns transmission windows was
added to the setup.
Finally the pulses enter into a Faraday Michelson
Interferometer (FMI), with a length unbalance be-
tween the arms that halves the initial pulse separation,
∆τ = 2.3 ns. Four equally spaced pulses are thus ob-
tained at the output of the interferometer. The tempo-
ral width of the pulses was electronically set to 800 ps
FWHM, which allows for a coarser temporal match be-
tween the initial two-pulse sequence separation and the
time-of-flight difference in the interferometer.
Despite the polarization not being controlled and the
pulses going over different paths, the use of a FMI en-
sures that the polarization is the same for the four pulses
at the output of the interferometer. This is crucial to get
high visibility at the interferometric monitoring stage.
Throughout this process, patterns of four pulses are cre-
ated at a rate of 115 kHz. An FPGA engine controls
the trigger and separation between pulses, as well as the
timing and synchronization for the rest of the protocol
hardware.
The quantum state writing takes place at the client-
side (Alice) and is accomplished using a simple and ro-
bust setup compatible with the plug and play require-
ments; i.e. it must be polarization insensitive. Con-
trastingly, commercial Mach-Zehnder intensity modula-
tors (IM) usually have a strong dependence with the po-
larization. To overcome this polarization dependence we
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FIG. 3: State |decoy, `〉 prepared by Alice carved from a blank
pattern. The state is prepared using an IM which is synchronized
with the arrival time of the blank pulses at the client-side.
use a combination of a polarization beamsplitter (PBS)
plus an IM, as described in the appendix IV. The effect
of such arrangement is a polarization-insensitive action
of the intensity modulator, plus a polarization rotation.
For a packet of two symbols, where each symbol can
have three values, a total of nine different sequences can
be written by Alice. The IM used to tailor these states
is driven by a combination of electrical pulse generator
and similar to the one used for the EAM. In this case
we set the width of the electrical pulses to be 1850 ps, in
this way we assure a good extinction of the desired light
pulses even with a coarse time synchronization provided
by the FPGA (steps of ∼ 800 ps). Figure 3 shows one of
the prepared sequences ( |decoy, `〉 ) at Alice’s side.
B. Qubit reading and monitoring lines
The detection of the quantum states is performed at
the server side in two complementary bases, the monitor-
ing line and the data line. The latter registers the arrival
time of the detected photons which encode the bits of
the secret key, but gives no information when detecting
decoy states. In addition, the monitoring line measures
coherence between subsequent pulses. For this purpose,
the pulses re-enter the unbalanced FMI. Pulses originally
separated ∆τ will interfere at the FMI output and guided
to the monitoring detector via an optical circulator. In-
terference can be evaluated differently depending on the
arrival time of the detected photons. Coherence between
pulses is broken when sophisticated coherent attacks are
performed over several pulses, and it can be measured
between pulses belonging either to the same symbol or
to adjacent symbols: interference between pulses that
pass once through each of the arms of the FMI is called
“intra-bit” interference; in this case paths are automati-
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FIG. 4: Temporal distribution showing the |decoy, decoy〉 state
detected with the monitoring line at two different situations. The
green (lighter) curve shows constructive interference at the central
peak, while the violet (darker) curve shows a destructive interfer-
ence condition.
.
cally balanced and light exits through the desired output
of the beam splitter if an untampered decoy pulse has
been measured. In contrast, “across-the bit” interfer-
ence, which arises from two adjacent pulses of consecu-
tive symbols, the early pulse passing two times through
the long path and the late pulse going twice through the
short one) will be recombined with an arbitrary phase de-
pending on the path difference, hence requiring some kind
of stabilization procedure to assure the correct measure
of coherence between subsequent laser pulses. Figure 4
shows the count distribution for the state |decoy, decoy〉
with no active stabilization when constructive and de-
structive interference takes place in the monitoring line.
With these two conditions we can estimate the visibility
of the interferometer. Nevertheless, when using longer
pulse patterns, Alice and Bob can agree to shift the pulse
sequence by a single pulse, thus turning the “intra-bit”
pulse separation into an “across-the bit” pulse separa-
tion.
In this proof-of-concept experiment, we use only one
SPCM to perform the detection in both bases by tempo-
rally multiplexing the light signals with a beamsplitter.
By tuning the splitting ratio of the BS at the detection
line the probability of data and monitoring line detection
selection bases can be chosen: we have intentionally set
the monitoring line to data line detection probability to
be balanced to show more clearly the results of the two
bases within the same data stream. In a real world im-
plementation, though, the portion of the signal that is
sent to the monitoring line is in the order of 10%.
Figure 5 shows the count distribution at server side
for three states prepared by Alice, with different number
of decoy states. Single photon detection on either the
detection and the monitoring line takes place by dividing
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FIG. 5: Count distribution for three different states detected at
the server-side. The two detection bases are time multiplexed to
use only one SPDM. The orange and purple areas correspond to
the monitoring line and data line time-bins respectively. The de-
tection basis has a higher detection rate with a 65% of the detected
photons.
the signal into 2.3 ns time bins.
We calculate an average QBER of 6% from the dif-
ferent states that can be prepared. The origin of this
noise comes from two main sources: on the one hand
the extinction ratio of the IMs (Agere 2623N) is around
13 dB for RF driving signals. This limited performance
at the qubit writing stage accounts for almost 80% of
our mean QBER value. On the other hand, there is an
increased background noise in the multiplexed detection
stage we use for this demonstration: when preparing the
blank symbols part of the intense light at the output of
the FMI is coupled into the SPCM and therefore appears
as background noise in the monitoring and data detec-
tion basis. We tackle this issue by inserting an extra IM
after the laser output, which generates 35 ns transmis-
sion windows synchronized with the output pulses. This
mitigates the amount of spurious light at the SPCM, al-
though the achieved extinction ratio is not high enough
to neglect this effect. The system was run in a condition
where the measured mean photon rate per symbol at the
detection stage is R = 0.01; in this condition, the detec-
tor noise and the background light contribute with the
remaining portion or the bit errors.
The visibility of the decoy states is obtained from
the measurements in the monitoring line. For the self-
stabilized peaks (figure 4) we measure a visibility of
0.95 ± 0.05. We also study the fluctuations of the un-
stabilized interference peak. Figure 4 shows the count
rate for the central peak when Alice is emitting a
|decoy, decoy〉 state and no active compensation is per-
formed attaining a visibility value of 0.93 ± 0.03. The
reduced visibility is mainly due to the different arrival
time (around 100 ps) between the two pulses at the out-
put of the FMI.
III. DISCUSSION
Regarding the security of the protocol, it was shown
that Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks are not ef-
fective in the COW protocol, since there is information
encoded in the phase difference between pulses, so any
PNS attack will break the sequential coherent pulses, re-
sulting in an alteration of the visibility in Bob’s monitor-
ing line measurements. General security bounds against
individual attacks and also upper bounds for the error
rates against coherent attacks have been derived for the
COW protocol [23]; in the same work upper bounds
for collective beam splitting attacks were also obtained.
Zero-error attacks have also been studied for the COW
protocol [24]. More recently, lower bounds on the key
generation rate in a finite-size key scenario have been
obtained [22].
In the present setup, additional considerations must
be taken into account due to the plug and play config-
uration: during the transmission from Bob to Alice, co-
herent, multiphoton pulses may be easily tapped by Eve,
but there is no encoded information at this stage. Once
the bits are written by Alice and the pulse stream is sent
back to Bob, intense pulses that reach the client side
must be dimmed down to the single photon level before
being sent through the quantum channel. The insertion
loss of Alice’s arrangement is only 9 dB. Further atten-
uation is achieved using an optical attenuator (Fig. 1),
which imposes a total loss of 46 dB in its double pass
setting. Finally another 2 dB of attenuation is produced
by the two meter FC/PC fiber connectorized patchcord
separating Alice and Bob. It is worth to note that the
detection line is placed immediately at the server input,
and therefore the only additional losses are imposed by
the optical tap that sends a small portion of the light to
the monitoring line (with a transmittance as high as 0.9).
In this way, this particular demonstration starts with
a blank pattern of intense light pulses, which is lowered
down to a desired mean photon number output per pulse
at the client side of µA=0.5 [20]. We obtain a mean
photon number at the detector of µB=0.1 (a measured
photon rate R=0.01 taking into account a 10% efficiency
of the single photon counter). Such attenuation can be
interpreted to be equivalent to a 7 dB link loss, that is,
roughly 30 km of single mode fiber. Eavesdropping is
now meaningful, but as discussed above, it is obtained at
the expense of breaking the coherence between pulses and
reducing the visibility at the monitoring line. The proto-
col is therefore sensitive against intercept-resend attacks
and photon-number-counting attacks performed coher-
ently on two subsequent pulses [19].
We can estimate an upper bound for the secret key
rate, based on a security analysis that considers collec-
tive beam splitting attacks [23]. The security analysis is
similar to the one performed in a standard COW pro-
tocol [20], and in other, more recent, distributed-phase-
reference protocols [25]. Assuming an interferometer vis-
ibility of V=0.93, a dark count probability of 2.5× 10−5
5per time-bin, a ratio of key-to-decoy state emission of 9:1
and an input mean photon rate per pulse of µA=0.5,
for a 30 km fiber link we obtain a sifted key rate of
Rsift = 8.9× 10−3 which is in very good agreement with
the measured rate, and a theoretical secure key rate of
Rsec = 1.8 × 10−3 symbols per pulse. Optimization of
the input photon rate for such link attenuation leads to
a maximum Rsec = 2.0 × 10−3, for an optimized input
photon rate per pulse of µA=0.38. In the described ex-
perimental conditions, doubling the link length (from 30
km to 60 km) implies a reduction of the secure key rate
by an order of magnitude. For such large distances, Eve’s
available information is the term that dominates the re-
duction of the secure key extraction rate.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that it has been also
demonstrated that non-idealities that are present in any
physical implementations of QKD can be practically ex-
ploitable to obtain information on the generated key [26].
The amount of light at the output of the client must be
monitored to prevent a side channel attack (i.e. Trojan
Horse attack [27]). This task can be accomplished using
a PIN photodiode placed at the input of the client setup
and a narrow band pass filter. We have explicitly omit-
ted this detector to ease the description of the quantum
channel. Additionally, a linear optical detector might be
included at the server side to monitor the presence of in-
tense light pulses designed by an eavesdropper to perform
a faked-state-type attacks on the counting device [28].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a variation of the Coherent One-
Way QKD protocol in a Plug & Play configuration. This
arrangement allows for the utilization of a self-referenced
interferometer for the monitoring line detection, and for
the deployment of all the sensitive and costly hardware
components at a server side, while maintaining only an
intensity modulator at the client side. The pulse pat-
tern, synchronization, qubit writing and detector trigger-
ing were achieved using electronic pulsers built from ECL
logic components and an overclocked FPGA board as the
timing engine. The visibility of the unperturbed intra-bit
interference is stable and above 95%, and a 6% QBER.
The main feature of the present scheme is the efficient
use of the resources and the robustness of the interfero-
metric monitoring line, making it suitable for operation
under realistic environmental conditions.
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Appendix: PBS Ring Intensity Modulator
As mentioned in section II we implement a Polarization
Insensitive Intensity Modulator (PIIM) by using an IM
and a PBS in a ring configuration.
The PBS separates the incoming light into two orthog-
onal (linear) polarizations, which are coupled into the
same propagation mode (slow axis of the PM fibers) at
the PBS output ports. The IM is inserted symmetrically
between the two PBS ports, forming a closed, bidirec-
tional loop that connects the two ports of the PBS.
The PBS has input and output polarization-
maintaining Panda type optical fibers. Defining the two
fiber propagation modes of orthogonal polarization as
|H〉 and |V 〉 (linear polarization states), the state of a
photon entering the PBS can be generally described as:
|ψin〉 = α|H〉+ β|V 〉 where α, β fulfill the standard nor-
malization criteria. The PBS couples each incoming po-
larization component into the different ports with the
same output polarization; these outputs are then con-
nected to both ports of the IM. By doing this we en-
sure that all the light received by Alice circulates through
the IM with the adequate polarization state, allowing for
maximum modulation efficiency: the states are written
on the pulses by the IM acting simultaneously on both
signals. At the end of the trip through the ring, the PBS
ports are swapped (output b(a) with input a (b), figure
6). The overall polarization transformation produced by
the PIIM can be stated in the following way:
PIIM
{ |H〉 → |V 〉
|V 〉 → − |H〉, (1)
obtaining an output state |ψout〉 = α|V 〉 − β|H〉. This
transformation resembles the one performed by a Fara-
day Mirror, although all the rotations are reciprocal:
PIMM ∝ σy, where σy is the Pauli matrix which has
|R〉 and |L〉 as eigenvectors. The invariant states of such
IM
PBS a
bb
a
FIG. 6: A Polarization Insensitive Intensity Modulator is achieved
by exploiting the PBS mode coupling in polarization maintaining
fibers. This schematic diagram shows how the two modes enter to
the PIIM at the same time with different propagation directions
thus avoiding any polarization effect on the writing process.
“reflection” are the circular polarization states, whereas
a Faraday mirror action is proportional to σx [29], with
the diagonal states as eigenvectors. As a side result, the
counter-propagating pulse trains are recombined at the
PBS into a state which has its polarization rotated 90◦
with respect to the input state.
It is worth to notice that the device can be converted
into a ring Faraday mirror by adding an in-line 90 deg
Faraday rotator with its ports coupled to different axis
of polarization maintaining pigtails. In this situation,
any alteration to the polarization state induced by ther-
mal and mechanical perturbations of the fiber link are
minimized.
